Opinion BOOKS A Review: Beatley T. 1994. Ethical Land Use Practices: Principles of Policy and Planning. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

by Stan Stein and Tom Harper

This book makes a valuable contribution to contemporary planning theory and practice, by introducing a broader level of ethical and environmental awareness to land use planning. Land use decisions are inherently ethical, but these ethical issues often go unrecognized. Beatley highlights the (economic) utilitarian norms which routinely justify land use decisions. The book includes concise summaries of many positions (and debates) in contemporary substantive normative ethical theory, with a clear discussion of their relevance to land use decision-making. The brevity and clarity of these accounts makes them useful for teaching purposes, particularly the critical account of the economic utilitarian approach, and the discussion of a broad spectrum of views on ethical duties to the environment. However, the author's approach to ethical theory raises some concerns. He embraces "moral pluralism", which suggests no single paradigm is applicable in all circumstances" (p17), i.e., which moral approach applies will be determined by the "specifics of each land-use case" (p17). Although Beatley recognizes the importance of Rawlsian (wide) reflective equilibrium (p28,29), he does not apply this method to seek a coherent and consistent approach. In most specific cases several different moral approaches will be applicable, often giving conflicting answers. Moral pluralism in Beatley's sense is unworkable. Ultimately, one must have a stand which rejects some approaches and gives a rationale for those which are applied. Beatley does seem to have such a normative position: he strongly wants to conserve the (natural, physical) environment, but within constraints (which we would call liberal) relating to human rights and interests. He seems to accept the modernist error of assuming that the choice of values (including moral ones) is a bare choice: that no reason or rationale can be given. So he presents no reasons for the positions he takes on most debates; they seem arbitrary. But (we argue) his positions flow from his interest in (somewhat moderated) environmental preservation. For example, he believes living things have inherent moral worth, while rivers and rocks don't. But this moral intuition lacks reasoned justification Many of the arguments Beatley marshals in support of a much more conservationist position do have persuasive power: for example, he appeals to Utilitarian benefit maximization, Rawlsian concerns for the least-advantaged, individual rights, obligations to future generations, communitarian recognitions of cultural values, and obligations to other communities. These notions are all anchored in basic intuitions which are part of our moral tradition. Where he is not persuasive is in his advocacy of a new Environmental Ethic, a new paradigm which attributes inherent moral value to the environment and makes it an object of ultimate moral concern. This emphasizes one aspect of our moral tradition, while ignoring other crucial elements. What appears to be a mere incremental extension of current moral discourse, could have very serious negative moral effects. Even if we were to agree that the environment has inherent value, this does not establish that it has inherent moral value. Do animals, like humans have the right to be left alone? Beatley does not offer good reasons for these strong claims. Beatley gives an historical account of the incremental expansion of rights from a narrow class of persons to all persons, and then presents rights for nature as a logical extension of this progression. But once we go beyond people, where do we stop? Beatley stops at sentience, but he doesn't give us good reasons why. If we extend the notion of rights too far, we risk losing any meaningful difference between objects of moral concern and anything else. Extending rights to (nonhuman) nature may not only produce destructive consequences for people (e.g. save the rain forest while Brazilian workers suffer economic hardship), it muddies moral discourse with concepts like bioegalitarianism. This effort seems to engender unnecessary conflict and infighting amongst people who share (roughly) common ends, and who should be working towards a broad general consensus about environmental respect and protection. Most of Beatley's positions do not require bioegalitarianism. The ordinary anthropocentric arguments for conservation possess plenty of moral appeal, based on cultural ideals of stewardship that justify more conservation than current political conditions allow. Instead of advocating a new moral paradigm, we might better spend our time promoting ethical land use decision-making and action. (This review is a condensation of one published in the Journal of Planning Education and Research, 1995, 15:1.)

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