5.5 The Impact of Indentured
Labour
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Asia There exists little scholarship on the
demographic effects of the indentured trade and other
overseas emigration on the migrants’ countries of origin.
Although the trade targeted the same demographic group as
the trans-Atlantic slave trade, namely young men between
twenty and thirty years of age, this movement of indentured
migrants seems to have a less detrimental effect on
population than the earlier slave trade. One of the most
obvious reasons for this difference was that many of the
sending countries were suffering the effects of
overpopulation, including larger numbers of often poor rural
inhabitants coming to the cities in search of work, creating
a supply of willing recruits whose loss did not affect the
population growth of the country as much the earlier
situation in Africa, where land was relatively plentiful and
large numbers of landless individuals were simply not
present. Even though the greatest number of indentured
workers came from India, the percentage of indentured
migrants leaving the country in any given year was only
about 0.01 per cent of the country’s total population. It
must be remembered, also, that even though large numbers of
migrants left their homelands, many returned home after a
period of time, so the net loss to sending countries was not
as large as the number of emigrations make it appear. Even
if this migration meant a net loss to the population of
India, many contemporaries considered this beneficial
because, in their opinion, the country was too populated,
and emigration was necessary to prevent the starvation
caused by crop failures and epidemic diseases. Although the
Indian government denied that emigration was connected to
prevailing poor conditions within the country, it did not
attempt to curtail the numbers of emigration in any way. It
is difficult, however, to draw any definitive conclusions,
as much more research needs to be done in this area.
The demographic impact of indentured
labour and other Asian immigration varied tremendously
throughout the New World. In many areas the end of the trade
signalled a diminished presence of labourers as governments
sought to discourage permanent settlement through
discriminatory policies. In North America, for example, the
discrepancy in sex ratios as well as exclusionist government
policies ensured that Chinese and Japanese populations in
Canada and the United States would remain low and segregated
in distinct communities. The same was true for Chinese
indentured populations in Cuba and Peru, where an extreme
imbalance in the sexes caused a reduction in their numbers
after the ending of indenture. In other areas, such as in
the West Indies, indentured African migrants were absorbed
into the much larger pre-existing Afro-Caribbean population
created by freed slaves and their descendants. In some
cases, migrant populations remained a strong and distinct
part of their overseas environments, as was the case with
the Chinese and Japanese populations in Hawaii, who made up
more than half of the islands’ population until into the
1920s. Migrants from India and Java became the majority in
British Guiana, Réunion, and Mauritius, replacing
Africans as the dominant cultural group. By 1921 Indians
made up more than one-third of the population of Trinidad. In
areas where sex ratios were more equal, natural reproduction
ensured a stable population, as children born in these new
areas were less susceptible to the diseases that had
afflicted the first arrivals.
As with trying to assess other areas
of the impact of indenture, there is very little information
concerning the economic impact of indenture on sending
countries. If the demographic impact was negligible in these
countries, one could assume that the economic impact was
just as much a non-issue. In the case of India, its economic
position was also tied in with the effects of British
imperial control, and indenture could be seen as another
branch of that control, which kept Indians in a subservient
economic position for the betterment of British planters and
the British economy. It is true that overseas migrants
generally fared better than those individuals who migrated
within India. Returning migrants to India from Surinam, for
example, brought with them an average of sixteen pounds (two
years’ wages in India), however, profits varied greatly and
those who were sick or disabled often returned with nothing.
As well, migrant workers who chose to return to their
homelands after the expiration of their contracts, sometimes
after as many as fifteen or twenty years, often faced an
environment that was very different from the one they had
known. So many individuals had difficulty fitting in and
readjusting to life in India that the government actually
considered establishing separate communities for returned
migrants, as it was usually those who were unsuccessful who
returned to India.
In most cases, the economic success of
the plantation didn’t often trickle down to those who
contributed their labour to its success. Low wages were a
continual source of discontent for labouring communities,
and often led to “mischievous agitation against employers”
by almost every ethnic group. The economic development of
the individuals who remained in the colonies depended on a
large number of factors, including the type of work being
performed, the wage, the attitude of the employer, the other
opportunities offered them in their new homes, as well as
the cultural heritage which the migrants brought with them.
The Japanese in Hawaii, for example, were already a
significantly literate group upon arrival on the island, due
to the rapid expansion of education in Japan in the late
nineteenth century. After indenture and with the aid of
successful immigrants who had not arrived as contract
workers, they were able to move into a wide range of
occupations, and entered the learned professions at an
earlier date than other migrant communities. Stereotypes and
prejudicial attitudes, however, continued to exclude other
communities from the more economically profitable
occupations, and many continued to be denied the franchise.
An individual’s cultural background could also influence
their economic success in their new homes. Groups such as
the Indian population in Trinidad, for example, placed less
emphasis on formal education, many having been rural
residents in India with limited access to schools, which
resulted in this group being the most economically depressed
group in Trinidad, although there were significant
distinctions within Indian communities and certain groups
were more economically successful than others.
The Americas and Caribbean The cultural legacy of Asian immigrants to the Americas and Caribbean is vibrant and extremely varied. Each migrant community affected, and was affected by, the area in which they settled, which makes defining a general “Indian” or “Japanese” contribution nearly impossible. All of these groups, however, shared certain common characteristics. Each was a part of a “plural society”, one made up of a wide variety of cultural and ethnic groups, defined along lines separating one group from another. The degree of separation, however, varied from area to area. In many areas, for example, Indian and African groups tended to distance themselves from one another, however in the West Indies the groups were hostile towards the rapid economic success of Portuguese migrants. Most historians agree that caste divisions among Indian communities tended to be subsumed into larger orders of Hinduism, however, language, region, and these larger caste divisions tended to be reinforced by marriage which further segregated overseas communities. Indian language in Surinam, conversely, became a mixture of Indian dialects into a distinct language, known as Sarnami, which adopted its own grammatical forms and which borrowed words from Sranan Tongo, the primary language of Surinam. This development is unique in the Caribbean; in other areas, such as Trinidad or British Guiana, the superiority of English was stressed by the government and most migrants communicated in English, whereas the government of Surinam was more lax about instituting a comprehensive cultural and educational policy. The Hindu religion in the Caribbean also proved a remarkably flexible institution, and the widely varying beliefs of arriving migrants gradually morphed into a more uniform Caribbean Hindu religion, aided by the loosening of caste structures. One observer noted that in extreme cases Hindu immigrants “lose their respect for the caste and the religion of their fathers which they neglect, and acquire no other in its place. [...] One of their reasons for not returning to India is that they would be despised and mobbed in their native villages or have to spend much money for re-admission to their caste.” Working-class Africans in Jamaica, responding to oppression and low wages, responded with a spiritual movement known as “The Great Revival”, and many religious sects present in the island’s culture today probably owe their existence to the movement. It began in the Moravian church in 1859 and quickly spread to the Baptist and Wesleyan congregations, combining both Christian and African elements such as dancing, drumming, and spirit possession, which was frowned upon by Christian missionaries. A testament to the growing power of the movement and the people themselves is evident in the comment of a disgruntled Westmoreland official, who complained of the noisy Revivalist meetings and that the “people are under the impression that they can do what they like in their own places”. Chinese and Japanese migrants in North America, who were primarily Buddhists or Taoists, affected and were affected by the dominant white culture in different ways. Chinese migrants, who were overwhelmingly male, settled in Chinatowns in urban centres, where they could find the support of family and friends, or were scattered in much smaller numbers in the tiny towns along the western coastline. The cohesiveness and solidarity of Chinese culture in Chinatowns, segregated from the white community, prevented the kind of acculturation to be found in other groups. As well, Chinese migrants had their aspirations turned towards China by both their family traditions as well as by the oppression faced by many Chinese in North America. Even some of those born in North America felt that they had “to look to China for their life work”. Japanese migrants, conversely, some of whom were political exiles because they belonged to particular Buddhist sects, were generally more willing to adopt the culture of their new homes, and raise their children as “Americans” or “Canadians”, rather than “Japanese”. One father told his son to continue “with American higher education ... show the Americans your ability ... that is your duty to your parents", an attitude which was shared by many. For others, the adoption of Christianity was a hallmark of successful adaptation, one Japanese Christian group going so far as to resolve that “Americanization can only be realized through Christianity”. The implication that to be anything other than a Christian was to compromise the new migrants’ allegiance is evident by the group’s further statement that “we who are in the United States are to be, first of all, loyal to our land of adoption.” Those Japanese who did become Christians, however, were almost totally segregated, as were African Americans, from their white counterparts in the churches. Although conflict between Buddhists and Christians was relatively rare, Buddhist priests were one of the groups singled out for incarceration in internment camps during the Second World War.
There is much more scholarship which needs to be done on the subject of indentured labour and other forms of Asian and African immigration. Many of the aspects of this huge topic are sources of intense debate amongst historians, while other aspects have barely begun to be explored. |
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